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A Comparison of Japanese and American
Taxation of Capital Gains
By BRIAN VAN VLECK*
Member of the Class of 1991
I. INTRODUCTION
A nation's tax code is one of the most important variables affecting
any business decision. How taxpayers invest their resources is often de-
termined by the tax consequences of their investment options.' Invest-
ment is responsible for increased productivity, whether in the form of
research and development, new plants and equipment, or improved train-
ing for workers. Ultimately, only growth in productivity increases the
standard of living.
In the United States, a heightened concern for the economic conse-
quences of tax policy has coincided with an acute awareness that our
economy is in a state of relative decline.2 The economic growth rate of
our major trade competitor, Japan, has consistently outpaced the growth
in the American economy While the American economy has been ex-
panding at 2 percent to 2.5 percent or less each year, Japan's economy
has managed to grow at a rate of 4 percent or 5 percent.4 Japan has
achieved this level of success because it allocates a full quarter of its gross
national product (GNP) to investment in new factories, equipment, and
research. The United States, in contrast, allocates only one-eighth of its
GNP for such investments.' American policymakers recognize the need
to stimulate higher levels of domestic investment. Specific proposals,
however, have proven divisive.6 Within this context, the capital gains tax
* B.& with High Honors, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1988. The author
would like to thank Professor Stephen A. Lind for his help with this Note.
1. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 453 (3d ed. 1986).
2. McCauley, Joint Economic Committee Holds Hearings on Japanese Tax Policy, TAX
NOTES, Oct. 1, 1984, at 14.
3. P. KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT PowERs 417 (1987).
4. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1990, § 3, at F13, col. 2.
5. Id.
6. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1990, at Al, col. 6 (describing the partisan debate over propo-
sal to stimulate investment by cutting the capital gains tax rate.)
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has once again come to the forefront of American political debate.7
Japan's level of investment has been the result of a very deliberate
national commitment to achieving high growth. Reduced taxation for
capital gains has been a centerpiece of Japan's postwar economic policy.,
Rather than follow the Japanese example, however, the United States has
chosen to pursue the opposite course. With the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
the capital gains tax was increased to a level of parity with other forms of
income.9 While Congress retreated from this policy somewhat in 1990
by enacting a very limited preference for capital gains, 10 this measure
falls far short of the extensive preferences accorded by the Japanese
system.
This Note will analyze both the Japanese and American approaches
to capital gains taxation, and will weigh the relative merits of each sys-
tem, placing an emphasis on potential reforms of American tax law. This
Note will then propose legislation for the United States which draws on
the experiences of both nations while eliminating many of the serious
political and economic problems which are inherent in the current law of
capital gains taxation.
II. CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. History
The concept of taxing the gains that result from the appreciation of
capital assets has always been problematic for American tax policymak-
ers. 11 Although the owner's wealth has increased,12 such gains have tra-
ditionally been characterized as distinct from the more conventional
forms of income such as salary, interest, or dividend payments. 13
In 1872 the Supreme Court held in Gray v. Darlington 14 that capital
7. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1990, at Al, col. 6; see also Flanigan, U.S. Is Getting What
It Asked for in Japan, L.A. Times, Feb. 7, 1990, at D1, col. 2.
8. See Sheppard, What We Can Learn From the Japanese, 'FAX NOTES, Apr. 20, 1987, at
224.
9. General Explanation of The Tax Reform Act of 1986, 74 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)
178 (May 8, 1987) [hereinafter General Explanation of TRA 1986].
10. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § lll01(a), 104
Stat. 1024. Congress set a maximum rate of 28% for capital gain as opposed to 31% far
ordinary income. This provision is discussed infra.
11. F. SANDERS & D. WESTFALL, READINGS IN FEDERAL TAXATIaON 493 (1970).
12. J. FREELAND, S. LIND & R. STEPHENS, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 647 (1987).
13. Id.
14. 82 U.S. 63 (1872).
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gain was not income within the meaning of the Civil War Income Tax
Act. 5 The petitioner had purchased treasury bonds in 1865 and sold
them four years later at a profit of twenty thousand dollars. The Civil
War Income Tax Act called for a levy on all "gains, profits, and income"
for the year.16 Despite the statutory language, Justice Field, writing for
the majority, held that mere advance in value in no sense constitutes the
gains, profits, or income specified by the statute.1 7 It constitutes and can
be treated merely as increase of capital, and therefore does not fall within
the statutory definition of taxable income.
The sixteenth amendment, which empowers Congress to tax income
directly, contains no comprehensive definition of taxable income." Con-
sequently, the Income Tax Act of 191619 was challenged as unconstitu-
tional in Merchant's Loan and Trust Co. v. Smietanka2 ° because it
attempted to tax capital gains as income. The plaintiff; who was acting
as the trustee of a large portfolio of appreciated stocks and bonds, con-
tended that it had not earned taxable "income" when it merely sold one
piece of property in order to buy another. It argued that the trust's fi-
nancial position remained unchanged by such a transaction and that "the
change in form by the conversion does not make any change in sub-
stance."21 The Supreme Court rejected these arguments and held that
capital gains were in fact taxable income within the meaning of both the
Income Tax Act and the sixteenth amendment.' 2
The holding in Merchant's Loan merely shifted the debate to Con-
gress. 3 Within a year of the Court's ruling, Congress enacted legislation
which provided for a reduced tax rate on capital gain proceeds.24 Con-
gress intended to alleviate the so-called bunching effect. 5 Bunching of
income occurs when the profit realized from the sale of property, which
has appreciated over years or even decades, is taxed all at once in the
15. Act of Mar. 2, 1967, § 13, 14 Stat. 477-78 (1867).
16. Id at 478.
17. 82 U.S. at 65.
18. The sixteenth amendment states only that "The Congress shall have power to lay and
collect incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XVI.
19. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, 39 Stat. 756.
20. 255 U.S. 509 (1921).
21. Id at 511.
22. Id at 521-22. Interestingly, in England, the argument that capital gains were not
income was widely accepted during the first half of the twentieth century. R. MAGILL, TAXA-
BLE INCOME 82-103 (1945). It was not until 1965 that capital gains were finally made taxable
under British tax law. Finance Act, 1965, pt. III.
23. R. MAGILL, supra note 22, at 111.
24. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 106(a)(6), 42 Stat. 227, 232 (1921).
25. See, ag., R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 199 (1964).
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year of sale, usually at a high marginal level because of the progressive
tax rates. Congress believed that the bunching effect caused a substantial
restraint on the sale of capital assets. For example, the Ways and Means
Committee reported:
The sale of capital assets is now seriously retarded by the fact that
gains and profits earned over a series of years are under the present law
taxed as a lump sum (and the amount of surtax greatly enhanced
thereby) in the year in which the profit is realized .... In order to
permit such transactions to go forward without fear of a prohibitive
tax, the proposed bill... adds a new section... [placing a preferential
rate on gains from the sale or disposition of capital assets].26
Implicit in the committee's analysis is a recognition that taxing capi-
tal gains at a reduced rate would encourage investors to sell their appre-
ciated assets, thereby creating taxable transactions. Taxing a larger
number of sales at a lower rate could produce almost as much revenue,
and possibly more, than a higher tax on a smaller number of sales.27
Congress also believed that several factors required capital gains to
be treated as a separate category of income, deserving of special treat-
ment: capital gains may result merely from a continuation of the same
investment in a new form; capital gains may represent nothing more than
inflationary increases in the cost of an asset; and capital gains may have
accumulated over such a long time that it would be unfair to tax the
entire gain in the year of sale.28 For example, an investor may sell a
building and use the proceeds to buy a virtually identical building at a
different location. A property held for an exceptionally long time may
sell for four or five times its original purchase price; yet, in inflation ad-
justed dollars, it may actually be worth less than the purchase price. In
these situations, it seems unfair to fully tax the gain from the sale.
For these reasons, as well as a desire to stimulate taxable transac-
tions and increase revenues, Congress favored capital gains. It was not
until later that stimulating investment became the preeminent justifica-
tion for preferring capital gains.2 9
Despite a generally prevailing consensus that capital gains should be
favored, there has been considerable debate over how this treatment
should be structured. Congress has periodically changed the specific
26. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. 10-11 (1921).
27. This is essentially a description of the so-called Laffer Curve. See, e.g., E. BROWNING
& J. BROWNING, PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE PRICE SYSTEM 452-54 (3d ed. 1987).
28. J. FREELAND, S. LIND & R. STEPHENS, supra note 12, at 648.
29. See, e-g., Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation of Publicly Held Stock,
76 YALE L.J. 623 (1967).
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terms of the capital gains law as its emphasis on the various justifications
has shifted. Thus, the law has been in a state of flux since the early
1920s. In 1921 the maximum rate was 12.5 percent and an asset had to
be held for over 2 years to qualify for the reduced rate.' By 1934 the
formula involved a sliding scale in which the percentage of gain taxed
was inversely related to the number of years the asset had been held. 1
Under this plan, capital gains received no preferential treatment unless
the property sold had been held for over one year. Thereafter, the per-
centage of gain included in income declined the longer the taxpayer
owned the asset, reaching a minimum of thirty percent after ten years.
In 1942 the sliding scale was eliminated and a maximum ceiling was
placed on gain from the sale of property that had been held over six
months.32
As the balance between economic philosophies and various political
factions shifted, so did the capital gains tax rate.33 Between 1942 and the
mid-1980s the holding period went from six months to nine months' to
one year, and then back to six months again.35 Furthermore, both the
rates of taxation and the definitions of "capital assets" were altered.36
Prior to the 1986 tax reform, the capital gains provision exempted sixty
percent of a taxpayer's gain from his taxable income.37 Since the maxi-
mum individual tax rate at this time was fifty percent, 38 the maximum
tax on capital gains was twenty percent.39
B. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 represented a radical change in philos-
ophy toward the treatment of capital gains." Rather than continuing the
trend of increasingly preferential treatment of capital gains, Congress ab-
ruptly reversed the policy of the previous sixty-five years by making capi-
30. . FREELAND, S. LIND & R. STEPHENs, supra note 12, at 648.
31. Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, § 117(a), 48 Stat. 680, 714.
32. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 150(a), 56 Stat. 798, 843.
33. J. FR , S. LiND & R. STEPHENs, supra note 12, at 649. See also Blum, A
Handy Summary of the Capital Gain Arguments, 35 TAXEs 247 (1957).
34. Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 1402, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1731-33.
35. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1001(a), 98 Stat. 494, 1011-12.
36. See Surrey, Reflections on the Revenue Act of 1978 and Future Tax Policy, 13 GA. L.
REv. 687, 693 (1979).
37. I.R.C. § 1202 (1954).
38. Id.
39. Id. 100% - 60% (amount of gain exempted) = 40% (percentage of gain taxable),
40% X 50% (maximum tax rate) leaves a maximum tax liability of 20% of gain under the old
law. Id.
40. General Explanation of TRA 1986, supra note 9, at 6.
1991]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
tal gains taxable at the same rate as ordinary income.41 The sweeping
reforms of 1986 were motivated by widespread frustration with the in-
credible complexity of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code), resentment
of abusive tax shelters, and dauntingly high marginal tax rates of up to
fifty percent.42 Congress was therefore trying to make the Code simpler
and more fair while simultaneously lowering marginal rates and main-
taining adequate revenues. This balancing act required many political
compromises and trade-offs. The central trade-off, however, was that a
reduction in the marginal tax rates could be achieved only in return for
broadening the tax base.43 Collecting the same revenues while lowering
tax rates requires an increase in the amount of economic activity which
was fully taxable. For example, if a family has 100,000 dollars of income
but is allowed 50,000 dollars in deductions, the remaining income has to
be taxed at a rate of 50 percent to generate 25,000 dollars in revenues. If
no deductions were allowed, the same revenue could be collected with a
tax rate of only twenty-five percent. Before 1986 the availability of a
wide range of deductions allowed many taxpayers to shelter a large por-
tion of their incomes. In order to bring down rates, many of these tax
preferences had to be eliminated or drastically reduced. These prefer-
ences, often referred to as loopholes, included deductibility of personal
interest expense,' educational travel expenses,45 and the deduction of
excess losses from passive investments.46 The preferential treatment of
capital gains was also eliminated as part of this overall package.4 7 As a
result of the elimination of these deductions, as well as many others, the
tax rate was dropped from a maximum of fifty percent48 to only twenty-
eight percent,4 9 while the amount of tax paid by the average taxpayer
remained essentially unchanged.5"
Although Congress increased the rate of taxation on capital gains to
41. Id. at 7.
42. Id. at 7, 178.
43. Id. at 7.
44. I.R.C. § 163(h) (1986). Prior to 1987 all interest including consumer loans was tax
deductible. This deduction was phased out over four years. Id. § 163(b)6.
45. Id. § 162. Prior to 1987 travel expenses were liberally allowed as business expenses;
this provision was widely abused.
46. Id. § 469 (1988). Under previous law, "paper" losses such as depreciation could be
deducted against ordinary income in amounts which greatly exceeded the actual investment,
The 1986 bill requires that these losses can generally be deducted only against other "passive"
income.
47. Id. § 301. Under previous law, only 40% of capital gains were taxed as income.
After 1987 they were fully taxable as ordinary income.
48. General Explanation of TRA 1986, supra note 9, at 7.
49. I.R.C. § l(a)-(e) (1988).
50. General Explanation of TRA 1986, supra note 9, at 7.
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match the tax on other forms of income, they also made clear their intent
that, as a matter of policy, such gains should be taxed at a comparatively
low rate:
The Congress believed that the top rate on individual capital gains
should not exceed the maximum rates set forth in the Act, and there-
fore the Act provides that the maximum tax rate on capital gains will
not exceed the top individual rate that the Act provides in the event
that the top individual rate is increased by a subsequent public law
(unless that law specifically increases the capital gains). 1
With an eye to the future, Congress thus retained the mechanism in
the Code by which capital gains are distinguished from other forms of
income.5 2 Congress also set a permanent ceiling of twenty-eight percent
on capital gains.5 3 These actions foreshadowed the 1990 legislation, in
which the top individual rate was in fact raised to thirty-one percent and
the tax on capital gains was maintained at a constant rate of twenty-eight
percent.54
C. President Bush's Proposals and Current Debate in Congress
During the presidential race of 1988, George Bush campaigned on a
platform that included a reduction in the capital gains tax as a major
plank.5 Once elected, Bush's attempts to turn his campaign promise
into legislation met with the criticism that it was an unnecessary tax
break for the rich.
When an actual bill was introduced in the fall of 1989, it called for a
reduction in the tax rate on capital gains from 28 percent to 19.6 percent
for a period of 2 years, after which it would return to 28 percent.56 At
the end of the two years, however, the tax rate would return to the same
level as ordinary income but the value of the asset would be indexed to
inflation. 7 The bill passed in the House of Representatives by a large
margin 58 but was prevented from reaching a vote in the Senate by a fili-
buster organized by Democratic leaders.
51. 1,M at 178.
52. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-106, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMrN. NEws 4075, 4194.
53. I.R.C. § 1(j) (1988).
54. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11101(c), 104
Stat. 1024 [hereinafter Omnibus Budget Act]; I.R.C. § 1(h) (1991).
55. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
56. H.R. 3628, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. 8255 (1989).
57. Idk at 2856. Indexing to inflation allows the amount of profit from the sale of property
which resulted solely from inflation to be excluded from income.
58. Id at 1.
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In 1990 the issue returned, this time overshadowed by an impending
record level federal deficit. President Bush once again pushed for a capi-
tal gains cut. But as budget talks proceeded, Democratic leaders once
again forced him to abandon his insistence on a substantial capital gains
tax cut as part of a compromise on deficit reduction.5 9 The resulting
legislation included only a watered down version of a capital gains pref-
erence: the rate for capital gains remains twenty-eight percent while the
maximum marginal rate for ordinary income was increased from twenty-
eight to thirty-one percent.'
In practice, this level of preference for capital gain will not have a
significant effect for many taxpayers. For example, if a married couple
has 90,000 dollars of taxable income, including 30,000 dollars in capital
gains, they would owe a tax of 20,981.50 dollars under the new law.6
The reduced rate of tax on their capital gains results in a savings of only
348 dollars.62 This savings is relatively small because the 3 percent dif-
ference between the 31 percent rate on ordinary income and the 28 per-
cent rate on capital gains only applies when total income is greater than
78,400 dollars.63 The 348 dollar tax savings equals 3 percent of 11,600
dollars (90,000 dollars-78,400 dollars).6 This degree of preference is
generally not considered sufficient to affect many investment decisions. 65
Additionally, this provision has the perverse effect of actually raising the
tax on capital gains for those few taxpayers who have capital gains and
are in the lowest bracket of fifteen percent.66
Proponents of a capital gains cut remain committed, however, 67 and
a more extensive cut will undoubtedly be reintroduced in the near future.
Such a preference, when and if enacted, could take a variety of forms.
Several different proposals have been advanced, including a return to
some kind of sliding scale as existed in the 1930s, and the introduction of
various plans for indexing to inflation. In the end, however, these new
59. N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
60. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § lll01(a), 104
Stat. 1023.
61. This is computed by applying the current statutory rates under Section 1. Thus, the
married couple would owe $12,581.50 on their $60,000 in ordinary income (which is taxed at
28%) and another $8,400.00 on their $30,000 of capital gain (also now taxed at 28%). M.
MACMILLAN, A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE OMNIBUS BUDGiT RECONCILIATION ACr ov
1990, at 14-15 (1990).
62. Id. at 15.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. San Francisco Chron., Oct. 26, 1990, at A18, col. 1.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, supra note 59.
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ideas are simply variations on the conventional formula which allows a
reduced rate of tax on sales made after an arbitrary holding period.
Given the long history of controversy over this issue, there is little reason
to expect that any of these plans will lead to lasting legislation.
D. Non-Recognition Provisions
While the political debate has always centered on the desirability of
reducing the tax rates imposed on capital gains, other less well known
provisions of the Code have allowed capital gains to be earned without
incurring immediate tax liability. Two of these provisions, Internal Rev-
enue Code sections 1031 and 1034,8 allow a taxpayer to dispose of in-
vestment property (section 1031) or a personal residence (section 1034)
at a profit and yet pay no tax. These sections may seem to resemble some
of the unfair loopholes which were largely eliminated during the 1986 tax
reform. Yet, these provisions are two of the most popular and least con-
troversial in the Code.69
Section 1031 authorizes what are commonly known as like-kind ex-
changes.7" If an investor exchanges property for sufficiently similar
property, no tax is assessed, even if the new property is worth substan-
tially more than the original purchase price of the old property.71 For
example, if an investor bought an apartment building for 200,000 dollars
and it is now worth 300,000 dollars, selling it would result in 100,000
dollars of taxable income, ignoring the effects of depreciation and other
adjustments to basis.72 But, Y instead of selling it outright, the investor
was to trade it for like-kind- roperty worth 300,000 dollars, the investor
would pay nothing in taxes. 3 The term "like-kind" has been liberally
construed; not only a new apartment building but raw land, or any other
form of investment real estate, would qualify.74 Section 1031, 7" however,
68. I.R.C. §§ 1031, 1034 (1988).
69. See D. SMrrH, FEDERAL TAX REFoRM 151 (1961).
70. I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1) (1988).
71. Id
72. "Basis" is an accounting term used to measure the value of an asset for the purpose of
determining gain or loss upon its sale. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 79 (5th ed. 1979). The
purchase price, or cost, will initially constitute the tax basis of a property. However, any
depreciation deduction allowed against the property will reduce the basis, while any capital
improvements to the property will increase the basis. See, eg., id Capital gain is computed by
subtracting a property's adjusted basis from the amount realized on its sale. I.R.C. § 1001
(1988).
73. See, eg., Commissioner v. Chrichton, 122 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1941).
74. Id
75. I.RLC. § 1031 (1988).
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does not apply to stocks and other securities.76
Section 1034,17 the provision dealing with the sale of one's principal
residence, is even more favorable to the taxpayer. This section functions
just as 1031 does, except it is not necessary to specifically exchange one
property in return for another.71 Instead, a homeowner may sell a prin-
cipal residence and, as long as the homeowner buys another residence
within two years for an equal or greater purchase price, no tax is paid on
the gain from the sale.79
It is important to realize that these provisions do not waive tax lia-
bility; they merely defer its collection. This deferral is accomplished
through the mechanism of the transferred basis.' Thus, in the apart-
ment building example, the investor's new building would assume the
same basis that the investor had in the old buildirg-200,000 dollars."1
Were the investor to subsequently sell the new building for cash at its fair
market value of 300,000 dollars, the investor would have to recognize
and pay taxes on the 100,000 dollars gain. The same result would occur
if the original building had been sold for cash. The investor has merely
postponed paying taxes on the gain from the first property until the gain
from selling the second building is recognized. The investor may further
postpone tax liability by exchanging for a third building rather than sell-
ing the second. Similarly, under section 1034 a new principal residence
takes a transferred basis from the old residence.8 2
This principle also applies to a partial recognition in cash. If the
apartment owner had taken a 250,000 dollar building along with 50,000
dollars cash in trade for his old building, the entire 50,000 dollars pay-
ment is currently taxable because it has not been used to purchase the
replacement building.83 Furthermore, if the homeowner bought a new
home for less than the sale price of the old one, gain on the sale of the
first house would be recognized to the extent of the difference in home
prices.84 Thus, under these non-recognition provisions, the tax liability
on capital gain is deferred only to the extent that it is reinvested in a new
property. Any portion of the gain which is realized in cash is fully
taxable.
76. Id. § 1031(a)(2).
77. Id. § 1034.
78. Id. § 1034(a).
79. Id.
80. Id §§ 1031(d), 1034(e).
81. See id § 1031(d).
82. Id. § 1034(e).
83. Id. § 1031(d).
84. Id § 1034(a)-(e).
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The philosophy behind these provisions is based on the realization
that if one purchases property that is the same as the property sold, one's
economic position is unchanged and it would be unfair to impose a tax
on the transaction. The potential for abuse is low because tax is only
postponed to the extent that gains are continually reinvested.35 Thus,
these provisions are an extremely effective way of dealing with capital
gains because they encourage reinvestment of gain without granting an
unfair or expensive tax preference.
l. JAPANESE TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS
A. History
Japan did not experience constitutional difficulty with the taxation
of capital gains comparable to the controversy in the United States re-
garding the scope of the sixteenth amendment. Yet, as a system which
grew out of a feudal tradition,86 Japan historically tended to concentrate
on property and excise taxes87 which are easier to collect and adminis-
trate than taxes on capital gains or income.
The basic framework of the current Japanese tax system, like many
of Japan's institutions, is largely a product of the American occupation
following World War H.88 As such, it reflected the thinking of American
planners at that time and incorporated reduced rates of taxation on capi-
tal gains.89 Despite this strong American influence, the Japanese were
faced with their own unique concerns, which included the prospect of
rebuilding their economy from the ground up after its virtual destruction
during the war." Thus, in contrast to American preoccupation with
achieving tax equity, Japan's primary policy objective in the postwar era
has been to achieve a high level of economic growth.9 1 Achieving this
growth required accumulating enormous amounts of domestic capital.
Consequently, economic policy in general, and tax policy in particular,
85. This is true because the transferred basis represents the historical cost of the original
property. Thus, when the investor eventually sells, his total accumulated gain for all his suc-
cessive investments is represented by the difference between the ultimate sales price and the
transferred basis. See id § 1031(d).
86. General Explanation of TRA 1986, supra note 9, at 7.
87. NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. Rs., FOREIGN TAX PouciES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
52, table 7 (1966) [hereinafter FOREIGN TAX POLICIES]; see also Y. GOMI, GUIDE TO JAPA-
NESE TAXES 1989-90, at 12 (1989).
88. Sheppard, supra note 8, at 224.
89. Id.
90. Iad
91. McCauley, supra note 2, at 15.
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were heavily skewed toward generating this capital. 92
As a result, Japan has favored capital accumulation heavily through
a variety of economic incentives. For example, individuals are allowed to
accumulate up to 82,500 dollars in a special tax free savings account.93
Furthermore, double taxation9 4 on corporate earnings is avoided through
the use of a shareholder tax credit.9" This allows Japanese investors to
retain a larger portion of the return from their investment than Ameri-
cans.9 6 In addition, capital gains have been accorded highly favorable
treatment.9 7 In fact, until 1988 capital gains frora the sale of securities
were totally tax exempt.98 Finally, another strength of the Japanese sys-
tem is its stability, which allows investors to plan effectively without the
uncertainty of an unpredictable tax burden. 99 The Internal Revenue
Code of the United States is altered significantly each year with little
regard for the resulting uncertainty to taxpayers. By contrast, it is a ma-
jor Japanese policy goal to provide a stable business environment in order
to encourage investment and economic growth."c Japan's level of capi-
tal accumulation has also been aided by an extremely low level of public
debt101 and the lowest overall tax burden of any industrialized nation. 102
While other factors are involved, these policies have contributed sig-
nificantly to what can only be described as an economic miracle. Savings
and investment, as a percentage of GNP, rose to the highest levels in the
world 1 3 -averaging around twenty percent for much of the postwar pe-
riodl1 -- and economic growth followed suit.10 5 The years between 1950
and 1973 saw average annual growth of over ten percent, again the high-
est in the world." 6 The growth rate has leveled off in recent years as the
92. Id
93. Sheppard, supra note 8, at 224.
94. Double taxation occurs when corporate earnings are first subjected to a corporate
income tax when they are earned by the corporation, and are then subjected to a personal
income tax when they are distributed to shareholders in the form of dividends.
95. Sheppard, supra note 8, at 224.
96. Id
97. Id
98. Y. GoMi, supra note 87, at 12.
99. Sheppard, supra note 8, at 224-25.
100. Note, Intercompany Pricing of Intangibles Under Section 482: A Comparison with Jap-
anese Tax Policy, 13 HASTNGS INT'L & COMP. L. Rv. 179, 180 (1990).
101. Komiya, Japan, in FOREION TAk POLICIES, supra note 87, at 47-49.
102. WORLD TAX REFORM: A PROGESS REMORT 1-2, table 1 (J. Pachman ed. 1988) [here-
inafter WORLD TAX REFORM].
103. N.Y. Times, supra note 55.
104. L.A. Times, supra note 7.
105. P. KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 417.
106. Id. at 417-18.
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economy has matured, yet is still the highest in the industrialized world,
and is typically twice that of the American economy.10 7
Of course, imposing such light tax burdens on capital means that
revenue must be raised in some other way. Because of the heavy tax
preferences accorded investment, Japan has traditionally relied upon rel-
atively high taxes on consumption and, to a lesser extent, steeply progres-
sive tax rates on noninvestment income.108 A striking feature of Japan's
consumption tax system is its selectivity.109 Most countries have some
form of general consumption or value added tax which taxes all
purchases at a uniform national rate.110 By contrast, the Japanese sys-
tem relies heavily on a variety of specialized excise taxes. These taxes
include everything from special taxes on tobacco1 ' and aircraft fuel"12 to
an automobile tonnage tax," 3 and even a special golf course tax.114 It
has proven politically difficult to expand this system of excise taxation to
new products, however." 5 Consequently, those items which are already
taxable must bear a disproportionately heavy burden. 116 This widely va-
rying treatment leads to economic distortions and the misallocation of
resources. Furthermore, these consumption taxes are generally regres-
sive; that is, they account for a larger percentage of the incomes of low-
income taxpayers than of higher income taxpayers.1 17
B. Tax Reform of 1988
As successful as Japanese tax policy seems to have been in further-
ing postwar economic objectives, it has not been perfect. Dissatisfaction
with certain aspects of the Japanese tax code led to a reform movement
which culminated in major tax reform legislation in 1988.118 In the years
107. N.Y. Times, supra note 4.
108. Nagano, Japan, in WORLD TAx REFORM, supra note 102, at 163. During the seven-
ties, national and local taxes combined rose to a staggering 93% top marginal rate. If The
seeming paradox of a nation having the lowest overall tax burden of any industrialized coun-
try, see supra note 102, and yet simultaneously having among the highest marginal tax rates in
the world demonstrates the extent to which the tax base had been narrowed by special
preferences.
109. If at 156.
110. Id
111. Y. GoMi, supra note 87, 12-640.
112. Id 2-585.
113. Ik d 2-350.
114. IM/ 2-650.
115. Nagano, supra note 108, at 156.
116. IM. at 157.
117. Komiya, supra note 108, at 54.
118. Tax reform was actually composed of six individual bills. Y. GOMI, supra note 87,
1-200.
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since World War II, the Japanese economy had not only succeeded in
rebuilding but had become a global economic superpower with a diversi-
fied economy and one of the world's highest per capita incomes. Yet, the
tax system had remained essentially unchanged. Many Japanese re-
sented the fact that their salaries were being heavily taxed while invest-
ments were so heavily subsidized. 119 This perception was intensified by
the incredible increase in land and stock prices which resulted from the
postwar economic boom.12° As investors reaped huge profits from the
sale of these assets, the dissatisfaction with the tax system centered on
the capital gains provisions which allowed these investors to pay little or
no tax on their windfalls.12 1
The Japanese tax reform movement was also encouraged by the suc-
cess of tax reform in the United States,1 22 and the results of tax reform
in Japan were not dissimilar to those in the United States. The tax base
was broadened by scaling back tax preferences :For savings and invest-
ment income, and the tax schedule was flattened and simplified by re-
placing 12 different brackets ranging from 10.5 percent to 60 percent,
with 5 new brackets ranging from 10 percent to 50 percent.
1 23
C. Current Capital Gains Provisions
The Japanese Tax Code imposes separate capital gains taxes for se-
curities and real property.124 Since 1953 capital gains on the sale of se-
curities had, as a rule, been totally free from taxation. 2 Since 1989
however, gains from securities have been subject to the still highly
favorable tax rate of twenty percent.1 26 It appears that the motivation
for this change was largely based on equity considerations rather than
economic policy.127 The tremendous multidecade boom in the Japanese
stock market, which was certainly encouraged by this tax treatment, left
many investors holding portfolios which had appreciated by several
119. Nagano, supra note 108, at 156; Kaizuka, Comment, in WORLD TAX REFORM, supra
note 102, at 163-64.
120. Y. GOMI, supra note 87, % 1-200.
121. Id.
122. WORLD TAX REFORM, supra note 102, at vii.
123. Y. GOMI, supra note 87, 11-200. The current brackets and rates are: 0-3,000,000 yen-
10%; 3,000,000-6,000,000 yen-20%; 6,000,000-10,000,000 yen-30%; 10,000,000-20,000,000
yen-40%; over 20,000,000 yen-50%. COOPERS & LYBRAND INTERNATIONAL TAX NvT-
WORK, INTERNATIONAL TAX SUMMARIES 1990, at 5-12 (1990) [hereinafter INT'L TAX
SUMMARIES].
124. Y. GOMI, supra note 87, 1 5-250.
125. Id. % 5-260.
126. INT'L TAX SUMMARIES, supra note 124, at J-13.
127. Nagano, supra note 108, at 156; Kaizuka, supra note 119, at 163-64,
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thousand percent; yet, they paid no taxes whatsoever on this windfall.'
Not surprisingly, this created resentment among wage earners who were
paying marginal rates, including national and local taxes, of up to eighty-
eight percent. 29 These equity concerns, with obvious political conse-
quences, prompted the elimination of this tax free status, despite the
favorable effect on investment.130
In contrast with the treatment of securities, capital gains on land
and buildings are computed separately, and are further broken down into
long and short-term capital gain. 3 1 To qualify as long-term gain, land
and buildings must have been held for more than five and ten years, re-
spectively.' 32 Short-term capital gains are anything held for less than
this period.' 33 The distinction is significant because long-term capital
gains are subject to substantially preferable treatment. Long-term gains
are subject to a fiat tax of twenty percent on the first forty million yen of
gains and twenty-five percent for gains above that amount.134 Short-term
gains are taxed at a minimum of forty percent. 35 Furthermore, depend-
ing on the purpose for which the land or building has been used, substan-
tial special deductions are available.' 36 For example, a deduction of up
to thirty million yen is available if the property was used for housing137
or was expropriated by the government. 38 If land is used for a qualified
development project, twenty million yen are deductible. 39 If it is farm-
land which is being developed, only five million yen are deductible. 14°
Instead of providing for a reduced rate for real estate gains generally, the
Japanese use the concept of a potentially large deductible for which it is
difficult to qualify. Property must be held up to ten years, and the tax
treatment of gains are highly discriminatory in regard to the kind of land
use involved. The Japanese policy of subsidizing housing development
and agriculture tends to skew investment decisions at the expense of
other land uses.
These rigorous qualifications, however, are mitigated by the liberal
128. Y. GOMI, supra note 87, 5-260.
129. WORLD TAX REFORM, supra note 102, at 4.
130. Nagano, supra note 108, at 160.
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non-recognition provisions of the Japanese code. The Code section enti-
tled "Replacement of Business Property" provides that "(c]apital gains
are deemed not to have accrued, where the proceeds of a sale of land or
buildings used for business purposes are used by the taxpayer to acquire
land or buildings replacing the former .... 141
This is far more beneficial to the investor than the comparable
American "like-kind" provision,142 because instead of requiring a bilat-
eral exchange of property, the taxpayer need only use the proceeds from
any such sale to buy new investment property. Business property in Ja-
pan is accorded treatment which in the United States is reserved for resi-
dential property: the investor may roll over any gain into a new property
without a tax penalty. 143 The Japanese, as part of the general policy of
subsidizing housing, extend this same treatment, subject to certain hold-
ing periods, to personal residences as well, 144 with the added incentive
that gains are tax exempt up to three million yen. The first forty million
yen over that amount are taxable at ten percent. Any subsequent gains
are taxable at only fifteen percent. 145
IV. COMPARISON OF JAPANESE AND AMERICAN
TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS
It is often difficult to balance the competing claims made by the
special interest groups who square off in the debates over economic pol-
icy. In the field of taxation, however, Congress has developed specific
criteria for evaluating the merit of a given proposal. Congress has identi-
fied the goals of simplicity, fairness, and efficiency as the paramount con-
siderations in drafting tax legislation. 146  Congress is also vitally
interested in the effect any change will have on government revenues. 147
These criteria, therefore, provide a useful framework with which to com-
pare the Japanese and American systems.
A. Efficiency
Tax incentives have a powerful effect on the economic decisions
made by investors, wage earners, and consumers. The goal of efficiency,
or tax neutrality as it is sometimes termed, is furthered when these deci-
141. Id. 5-200(3).
142. I.R.C. § 1031 (1988).
143. Id. § 1034.
144. INT'L TAX SUMMAmES, supra note 123, at J-14.
145. Id.
146. General Explanation of TRA 1986, supra note 9, at 6.
147. Id. at 136.
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sions are made because of their economic merit rather than their tax con-
sequences.1 4  The incentives provided by returns on investments
encourage investors to allocate their resources in ways that are most
highly valued by consumers.149  Investors who seek out the highest re-
turns for their capital are therefore guided by the market to those invest-
ments which are most demanded by consumers."l  Under classical
economic theory, investors will therefore tend to achieve an efficient allo-
cation of resources by maximizing their own profits.' 5 1 However, inves-
tors are concerned with profits after tax, whereas benefits to the economy
and consumer welfare are measured by the economic return before taxes.
Thus, to the extent that investors are motivated by tax considerations,
they will tend to make economically inefficient investment decisions.
When they are forced to allocate their capital into lower yielding invest-
ments for tax purposes, everyone loses. The investors often earn lower
returns than they could have earned without the interference of the Tax
Code. The government loses revenues, and the economy in general ends
up with too many avocado farms, or whatever activity is artificially en-
couraged, instead of what market forces determine that consumers really
want. By 1986 it was widely felt that the Code was seriously distorting
business decisions and had led to an inefficient over-investment in indus-
tries such as real estate and agriculture.15 2 Congress voiced its desire to
address this problem when it adopted the 1986 reform: "Congress de-
sired to make the tax treatment of diverse economic activities more even.
Neutral taxation promotes the efficient allocation of investment and
yields productivity gains without requiring additional saving."' 5 3
The 1986 legislation did in fact make the Code more neutral. For
the most part, no form of income or activity is substantially favored over
another form. However, to the extent that increasing our national rate of
investment is a legitimate and beneficial economic goal, the current law is
too neutral. Although the current law does not discriminate in favor of
one investment over another, it also does not discriminate in favor of the
decision to invest over the decision to consume, and this inhibits eco-
nomic growth by reducing the level of investment.
In any event, the current law still creates certain economic distor-
tions because of the so-called "lock-in effect." This effect describes the
148. Id. at 9-10.
149. E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, supra note 27, at 16.
150. Id
151. Id
152. General Explanation of TRA 1986, supra note 9, at 6.
153. Id at 10.
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tendency of owners to hold properties until death because their sale
would trigger a large tax liability. A large contingent tax liability inhibits
the free alienability of assets. This effect was cited as a major rationale
for the very first capital gains preference enacted in 1921.154 More re-
cently, it was explained by a U.S. Treasury Commission report on the
possibility of reforms in the inheritance tax:
When tax liability is allowed to depend on whether an appreciated as-
set is sold or kept ... the tax law operates to produce undesirable
economic effects .... Assets become "locked in" by the prospect of
avoiding income tax .... This freezing of investment positions de-
prives the economy of the fruits of an unencumbered flow of capital
toward areas of enterprise promising larger rewards.155
To illustrate the lock-in principle, suppose an investor founds a
start-up company and its stock eventually increases from a few pennies
per share to one hundred dollars a share. Suppose also that the com-
pany is now past its growth stage and has leveled off at a constant ten
percent rate of return on its stock. The investor may feel that he could
sell his stock and use the capital to start a more profitable company
which would yield eighteen percent. Yet, the tax consequences may pre-
vent him from doing so. If he owned ten million dollars in stock in the
first company, a ten percent return would yield one million dollars a
year. If the tax on capital gain is fifty percent, however, he would have to
pay almost five million dollars in taxes on the sale of his original stock
(assuming that the basis of the stock is practically zero). Reinvested at
eighteen percent, his remaining five million dollars would earn only nine
hundred thousand dollars per year. Thus, it would be in his interest not
to sell his stock even if he could earn almost twice the return elsewhere,
and the economy thus loses the benefits of a new and profitable venture,
In contrast, the Japanese system strongly encourages the decision to
invest by taxing gains lightly. This allows investors to keep a larger por-
tion of the income from their investments and thus makes these invest-
ments more attractive than consumption.15 6 The reduced tax rate on
gains from securities also encourages liquidity in securities transactions
by lowering the penalty for selling appreciated stocks.15 7 However, the
strict ten year holding period for real estate transactions has a strong
distorting effect on economic decisions. A Japanese investor's incentive
154. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, 39 Stat. 756.
155. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, TAXATION OF APPREcIATION OF ASSETS TRANSFERRED
AT DEATH OR BY GiFr 334 (1969).
156. See generally R. POSNER, supra note 1.
157. See D. SMITH, supra note 69, at 147-48.
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to hold property for the full ten years inhibits the alienability of the prop-
erty and prevents other more profitable investments. The widely varying
treatment given to different land uses 58 skews investment choices still
further by favoring certain land uses at the expense of others.
The most economically efficient provisions in the Japanese and
American tax systems are the non-recognition provisions. By allowing
property to be traded without being taxed, the lock-in effect is elimi-
nated. Furthermore, by allowing taxpayers to shift their profits into new
investments without taxation, investment is maximized.
The problem with these provisions is the limitation of their scope.
In both the United States and Japan, gain from securities may not be
rolled over," 9 and in the United States, investment property must be
exchanged directly for like-kind property."6 These limitations inhibit
the utility of what would otherwise be an ideal way to favor capital gains
without distorting the economy. Permitting gain to be freely rolled over
into new investments encourages investment, while allowing capital to
flow to its most efficient use. To the extent that Japan is more liberal in
allowing this to occur, their system is more efficient in its treatment of
capital gains.
B. Simplicity
By 1986 many people in the United States felt that the ever ex-
panding complexity of the Internal Revenue Code was reaching crisis
proportions which threatened the American system of voluntary compli-
ance. 6' Filing a return often required a detailed knowledge of arcane
and often poorly written statutes, as well as meticulous record keeping
and paperwork. The assistance of an accountant or tax attorney was
considered necessary in order to fully take advantage of the tax laws.
Congress estimated in 1986 that the amount of time and money expended
by taxpayers in order to comply with the tax laws was equal to five to ten
percent of the revenues actually collected.1 62 Thus, Congress made sim-
plification one of the primary objectives of tax reform, noting that "sim-
plification of the tax code itself is a form of tax reduction." 163
Elimination of the capital gains preference was largely justified on
158. Y. GOMI, supra note 87, 5-200.
159. Id. at 126; I.R.C. § 1031 (1988).
160. I.R.C. § 1031 (1988).
161. General Explanation of TRA 1986, supra note 9, at 7.
162. Id. at 11.
163. Id.
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the grounds of simplification.' Yet, four years after tax reform was
enacted, elimination of the preferential tax rate for capital gains had
failed to eliminate any complexity from the Tax Code.165 There is no
doubt that a special capital gains taxing regime :requires statutory com-
plexity: assets must be characterized as capital and noncapital, 66 a spe-
cial holding period must be established, 167 and the concept of sale or
exchange must be defined. 168
Tax reform failed to simplify the law of capital gains, however, be-
cause even when all income is taxed at the same rate, it is still necessary
to differentiate between capital gains, capital losses, and ordinary income.
The distinction between capital gains and losses, and ordinary income
has to be maintained because taxpayers are only allowed to deduct capi-
tal losses against capital gains and not against ordinary income. If tax-
payers could deduct capital losses against ordinary income then investors
with a diversified portfolio would sell only their losing investments, de-
ducting these losses from ordinary income, while at the same time keep-
ing their winning investments and paying no tax on the appreciation. In
other words, they could selectively minimize their taxes by deducting all
their losses while never realizing their gains. 169 Thus, the 1986 Act by
necessity requires separate accounts for capital gains, which are taxed as
regular income, and capital losses, which can only be deducted against
capital gains and not other sources of income. This complex set of statu-
tory definitions and procedures is therefore inherent in any system which
allows investment losses to be deducted against income. 170 This observa-
tion led Professor Martin D. Ginsburg of Georgetown University Law
Center to remark:
Over the decades reams were written on the capital gain/loss taxing
scheme and the enormous increase in simplicity that surely would ac-
crue if only we could eliminate the special taxing regime. But none of
us, I suspect, conceived that Congress would eliminate the long-term
164. M. Ginsburg, Income Tax Complexity: Capital Gain and Loss Issues 10-5 (1989) (un-
published manuscript).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 10-4.
167. Id.
168. Id. The problem arises because certain financial transactions can significantly change
the nature of a property right. It must therefore be determined whether such an alteration is
significant enough to trigger a potential tax liability. For example, retirement of a debt Instru-
ment may constitute a "sale or exchange." I.R.C. § 1271(a)(1) (1988).
169. M. Ginsburg, supra note 164, at 10-6. Under current law a taxpayer must first deduct
all capital losses against capital gains; capital losses in excess or gains can be deducted from
ordinary income only at the rate of 3,000 dollars per year. I.R.C. § 1211 (1988).
170. M. Ginsburg, supra note 164, at 10-5.
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capital gain rate preference but retain the whole horrible technical
structure-capital asset, section 1231(b) property, capital gain, capital
loss, long-term, short-term, and all those nefarious sale/exchange/can-
cellation distinctions. In other words, Congress in 1986 found a way
to eliminate the rate preference while preserving virtually all the com-
plicating features of the special capital gain/loss taxing scheme.171
For this reason, the restoration of a small capital gains preference in
1990 could be inserted into the preexisting statutory framework with no
real increase in complexity.1 "2
The Japanese system not only recognizes a distinction between capi-
tal gain and ordinary income,17 but further distinguishes gains from the
sale of securities and gains from the sale of real estate.174 Gains from real
estate are further divided into long and short-term gains.175 These gains
are then accorded various degrees of special treatment based on the type
of land use involved.'7 6 Yet, the American system, even when it recog-
nized no preferential treatment of capital gains whatsoever, was almost
as complex in practice as the Japanese system.
C. Fairness
Maintaining a fair system is another vital congressional goal. The
essential objective is to ensure that individuals with similar incomes pay
similar amounts of tax. If some are able to exploit the system and greatly
reduce their taxes, it increases the burden on other taxpayers and re-
quires higher tax rates. People who are unable or unwilling to utilize tax
shelters may lose confidence in the fairness of the system. They may
respond by evading their own tax liabilities.'"
Opponents of a reduction in the capital gains tax rate concede that it
will stimulate investment, but they invariably claim that it unfairly gives
a windfall to the wealthy. 78 It is inevitable that any preference for capi-
tal gains will accrue disproportionately to upper income taxpayers, be-
cause sixty percent of all capital gains, excluding gains on personal
residences, are earned by the two-tenths of one percent of taxpayers with
incomes over two hundred thousand dollars a year. Eighty percent of
gains are earned by the one percent with incomes over one hundred thou-
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Y. Gomi, supra note 87, 1 5-250.
174. Id. 5-250, 5-260.
175. INT'L TAX SuMMAmES, supra note 123, at 1-13.
176. Y. GoMI, supra note 87, % 5-200(5).
177. General Explanation of TRA 1986, supra note 9, at 7.
178. N.Y. Times, supra note 59, at Al, col. 7.
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sand dollars.' 7 9 Despite these figures, there is widespread support for the
goal of increasing investment.'80 If legislation is to endure, however, it
must be perceived as a fair incentive for making economically beneficial
investments, rather than as a windfall for the rich. For example, the
backlash against the capital gains preference for securities which resulted
in the Japanese tax reform of 1988 was largely based on equitable con-
cerns."1 The long and unstable history of the law on capital gains in the
United States indicates that any cut in the rate of capital gains tax is
vulnerable to shifting public perceptions. Thus, any preference enacted
now may be repealed once political alignments have shifted or a new
administration takes office.
The temporary cut which was passed in the House of Representa-
tives in 1989 was unfair to the extent that it would have offered a tax
break to those who had already invested in the past without rewarding
those who would invest in the future." 2 This kind of temporary cut is
the most inequitable. It gives a windfall to those who are liquidating
their investments, which hurts the economy by encouraging taxpayers to
reduce the level of their investments. At the same time the cut provides
no incentive for the creation of new investment because the rate will rise
back to the level of ordinary income in the near future. Equity and effec-
tiveness considerations, therefore, dictate that such temporary cuts
should be rejected.
The Japanese and American non-recognition provisions represent
perhaps the most equitable way of dealing with capital gains. When tax-
payers roll gain from one investment into another, their financial position
is essentially unchanged in the sense that they don't have any more
money to spend on personal consumption than they had before. It is
arguable that such gain cannot legitimately be called income in the com-
mon sense of the word. These non-recognition provisions encourage tax-
payers to continually reinvest their capital."' 3 Only when the gain is
made available for personal consumption rather than invested, is it sub-
ject to taxation. Thus, it is difficult to argue that the investor receives an
undeserved windfall because the money the investor chooses to spend,
179. N.Y. Times, supra note 55, at C4, col. 3.
180. Id.
181. Y. GOMI, supra note 87, % 1-200.
182. The rate would have returned to its previous level after two years. Consequently,
anyone choosing to invest currently, and expecting to hold their assets for more than two
years, would not benefit from the law. See N.Y. Times, supra note 55.
183. By increasing the amount which taxpayers may reinvest after a sale (i.e. by not taking
taxes out first) reinvestment is made more attractive relative to the alternative of using the gain
for consumption purposes.
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rather than reinvest, is subject to the same tax as any other form of in-
come. This concept can be thought of in terms of a trust; as long as the
funds are left in the trust for the benefit of the economy, any tax liability
is deferred. Once withdrawn however, the tax bill becomes due. This is
precisely why the non-recognition sections concerning principal resi-
dences and like-kind exchanges have rarely been criticized as unfair and
remain extremely popular.'"
D. Revenue Effects
The effect on government revenues is another important and contro-
versial factor to consider when evaluating any tax cut. A cut in the tax
rate will generally produce less revenue. A cut in the capital gains tax
rate would increase the incentive to invest and encourage people to sell
their appreciated assets. Consequently, proponents of a reduction in the
capital gains tax rate claim that the tax revenue which would result from
both increased economic growth due to new investment and a surge in
taxable sales of property would more than offset the revenue lost from
the tax cut itself.'" 5 While this revenue raising aspect certainly exists, it
is extremely difficult to discern the extent to which increased investment
and sales of properties will compensate for lost revenue from the decline
in the rate itself."8 6 For this reason, it is virtually impossible to quantify
the exact revenue effect of the various Japanese provisions dealing with
capital gains. Similarly, the revenue effects of the small cut enacted in
1990 are uncertain, although the effect is undoubtedly slight, since both
the economic stimulus and the loss of direct tax revenues are so limited.
Most economists who studied the American proposal of 1989 concluded
that it would generate a small rise in revenues in the short term as inves-
tors sold properties to take advantage of the reduced rate, but would cost
billions of dollars in future years as transactions which would have oc-
curred anyway are subjected to lower taxes."'
The revenue effects of the non-recognition provisions employed by
both Japan and the United States are more predictable because they only
allow a taxpayer to defer taxes rather than to avoid them. If an investor
continues to reinvest taxable gain, the revenues which the government
will eventually collect are merely that much greater. For example, sup-
pose that a taxpayer could earn a ten percent return by continually sell-
ing and reinvesting a ten thousand dollar investment so that the entire
184. D. SMrrH, supra note 69, at 151.
185. N.Y. Times, supra note 55.
186. Id.; see also General Explanation of TRA 1986, supra note 9, at 1362, esp. table A-2.
187. N.Y. Times, supra note 55.
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amount of his gain was taxable at the end of each year. If the taxpayer
were to do this for ten years, the IRS would dutifully collect its share of
2,800 dollars per year (28 percent of 10,000 dollars) for a 10 year total of
28,000 dollars. If that same taxpayer invests 100,000 dollars of capital at
a rate of 10 percent annually and is allowed to continually reinvest his
gains at that same rate, at the end of 10 years the taxpayer will have
almost 260,000 dollars.188 If the taxpayer were then to sell, the IRS
would net (at the current 28 percent rate of tax) almost 45,000 dollars.
Thus, while the government has to postpone collection, the future reve-
nues which it can expect will grow at the same rate of return that the
investor is earning on the reinvestment. For thil reason, merely defer-
ring the tax liability will theoretically cost the government nothing in the
long-term and, to the extent that the taxpayer invests well, will actually
make a profit for the government.
V. PROPOSAL
The experience of the United States and Japan demonstrates that
stimulating capital accumulation through tax incentives requires a bal-
ancing of many different po1litical and economic factors. These compet-
ing considerations are most successfully balanced when taxes are
deferred on reinvested capital. Allowing investors to defer the recogni-
tion of income by reinvesting their profits 8 9 stimulates investment and
allows capital to move where it is most needed; it adso sidesteps the accu-
sation of unfairness by merely deferring tax on profits which are put to a
socially beneficial use. While Japan has generally been more liberal than
the United States in allowing gain to be freely reinvested, it also incorpo-
rates many restrictions such as a ten year holding period for long term
real estate gains and discriminatory tax rates based on the land use in-
volved.190 These kinds of restrictions lead to unnecessary complexity
and distorting economic effects. 91 As American policymakers prepare
to embark on a new round of capital gains legislation, they must consider
the lessons which are offered through a careful analysis of measures al-
ready adopted, in this country and abroad. This analysis indicates that
188. $260,000 equals $100,000 invested at 10% interest compounded for 10 years; or
(S10o,000)((1.1o)10).
189. In general, all gains which are realized, Le. reduced to spendable funds, are also simul-
taneously "recognized," that is, treated as taxable income. I.R.C. § 1001(e) (1988). Non-rec-
ognition provisions such as I.R.C. sections 1031 and 1034 allow taxpayers to avoid recognizing
realized funds by reinvesting or "rolling" them into a new qualified property. Id §§ 1031,
1034.
190. See Y. GOMI, supra note 87, 5-200(1)(a), 5-200(5).
191. See General Explanation of TRA 1986, supra note 9, at 9, 178.
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whatever legislation is ultimately adopted should be founded on the non-
recognition concept of allowing a taxpayer to postpone taxes by continu-
ally reinvesting profits. I propose the following legislation as a model
which, although representing a radical departure from current practice,
merely extends this policy of allowing tax deferred investment:
Sec. - - Qualified Investment Deduction
a) A deduction from taxable income will be allowed for the full
amount expended to acquire property to be held for investment
purposes.
b) The basis of all property acquired under subsection (a) shall be
zero.
c) Any excess deduction under subsection (a) may be carried back one
year and forward indefinitely.
d) Any gain from the sale of property acquired under subsection (a)
will be fully taxable upon the death of the holder.
e) Any amounts borrowed for the purpose of acquiring property under
subsection (a), or secured by such property, shall be included in taxa-
ble income.
f) Any repayment of indebtedness under subsection (e) shall be de-
ductible against taxable income.
The consequences of such legislation are not immediately obvious.
Allowing the total amount of any investment to be immediately deducti-
ble seems excessive. This deduction is balanced out, however, by setting
the basis of all such property at zero rather than at the purchase price.
Although the taxpayer may initially deduct the full amount of his invest-
ment, tax must be paid on the entire amount realized upon liquidating
this same investment. Under current law, only the difference between
the basis and the sales price is taxable gain. The net effect of the proposal
is that capital is totally exempted from tax, both when it is initially cre-
ated and when it is subsequently reinvested. Tax liability is only incurred
when funds are earned and then used for personal consumption rather
than reinvested.
As an illustration, suppose an individual earned 200,000 dollars in
salary. If the investor immediately invested 80,000 dollars of this income
in the stock market, this entire sum would be deductible. The investor
would have to pay tax only on the 120,000 dollars of salary which had
not been invested, but had been spent. If the stock rose in value, say to
120,000 dollars, and was then sold, the investor would have income of
120,000 dollars: the basis of the stock would be zero and the entire
amount would therefore be taxable gain. The investor would have the
option, however, of reinvesting the 120,000 dollars, thereby creating a
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deduction which would exactly equal the income from the sale. Were the
investor to spend the money on a yacht or some other form of personal
consumption, there would be no offsetting deduction and the IRS would
take its share, exactly as if the money had been earned in the form of
salary compensation and then spent. Finally, if the taxpayer had not
been so lucky, and the stock had dropped in value to only 80,000 dollars
before being sold, the taxpayer would still have 80,000 dollars in taxable
gain because the basis of the stock is still zero. But again, if the taxpayer
wanted to defer all or part of that tax liability the proceeds could be
reinvested for a new investment deduction.
Subsections (e) and (f) address leveraged investments, investments
which are made using borrowed money. Subsection (e) includes bor-
rowed money in income. This is necessary in order to prevent an inves-
tor from earning a deduction far in excess of his actual investment. For
example, if an investor purchases an apartment building for a million
dollars subject to a 900,000 dollar mortgage, the investor would not be
able to deduct a million dollars from income. Rather, the investor would
have a deduction under subsection (a) of 1,000,000 dollars, but would
have to declare the 900,000 dollar loan as income under subsection (f);
thus, the net deduction would be 100,000 dollars, or the amount of the
true investment in the building.
Subsection (f) allows a deduction for any increase in equity due to
repayment of borrowed funds which have been used for investment. For
example, if the above investor decided to put more of personal capital
into the investment by refinancing with a smaller loan of, for example,
500,000 dollars, the investor would be able to deduct 900,000 under sub-
section (f) for retiring the previous loan, but would have to declare the
new 500,000 dollar loan as income under subsection (e). The net result is
a 400,000 deduction, which is the amount of new capital that has been
invested.
Under current law, an investor who owns an appreciated asset can
take cash out of the investment without paying taxes by refinancing. 192
For example, if the investor described above had seen the value of the
building increase from 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 dollars, the investor could
have taken out a new mortgage on the property of, say, 1,700,000 dollars.
Using the proceeds of the new loan to pay off the previous 900,000 dollar
mortgage, the investor would then be able to pocket the difference of
192. Because borrowed funds are received concurrently with an offsetting liability they are
held not to constitute a net "ascencion in wealth" and are not taxable income. See IR.C. § 61
(1988).
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800,000 dollars. The investor's wealth has increased, the investor has
cash to spend on personal choices, and yet the investor has incurred no
tax liability. Subsection (e) prevents this "indirect realization" of profit
by including borrowed money which is secured by investment property
as income. Under subsection (e) the new loan of 1,700,000 is included in
income, under subsection (f) the repayment of the 800,000 loan is de-
ductible, and the net result of this refinancing is therefore a taxable gain
of 800,000 dollars, which is the true nature of the transaction. (Of
course, the investor could always invest this money in another venture
which would generate another offsetting deduction.)
Under all circumstances, the deduction applies only to the net capi-
tal investment. Any income which the investment produces, for exam-
ple, all net rental revenue from the above mentioned apartment building,
would be fully taxable when it is earned, regardless of the financing ar-
rangement. Although, of course, this income itself could always be
reinvested.
This proposed reform would encourage investment without creating
an undeserved windfall. In order to realize income for private consump-
tion, an investor has to pay taxes exactly as any other wage earner who
realizes the same income. Significantly, while this proposal would have
the effect of taxing only income used for consumption, it completely
avoids the problem of regressiveness normally associated with consump-
tion taxes. Consumption taxes, such as the elaborate Japanese system of
excise taxes, are regressive because they impose a disproportionate bur-
den on lower income taxpayers for whom consumption is a larger per-
centage of income. Unlike sales or value added taxes, which impose a
flat rate on consumption goods, the proposed reform would exempt capi-
tal first and then tax any remaining income at ordinary rates. However,
this remaining income, although used for consumption, is fully subject to
the progressive tax rates which now exist; the burden therefore will not
fall disproportionately on lower income taxpayers. This proposal is actu-
ally a progressive consumption tax. Thus, it combines the benefits of a
flat consumption tax which creates no disincentive to invest with the ad-
vantage of the progressive income tax which makes one's tax burden pro-
portionate to one's ability to pay.
Economic efficiency is enhanced because there are no restrictions on
reinvestment. There is no holding period or other penalty for selling as-
sets and there is no discrimination between different forms of investment.
A taxpayer is free to sell stocks or bonds and invest in real estate or oil
wells, or vice-versa. Capital is free to flow wherever the investor feels
that he can earn the greatest return. Furthermore, there is no rate differ-
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ential between investment income and wages. The decision whether to
finance consumption from salary or investment is therefore unaffected.
The only decision which is favored over another is the choice to invest
instead of consume, and this is the whole point of favoring capital gains
in the first place-to provide capital for economic growth.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of this reform is the extent to
which it completely cuts through the complexity of the present Code.
Because basis is automatically set at zero there is rio need to differentiate
between capital gains and losses-all costs of investment assets are
treated as deductible losses and all proceeds from their sale are treated as
taxable gains. Thus, the whole technical structure erected to restrict the
utility of capital losses is obviated. There is no need to wrestle with the
distinction between expenses and capital improvements because both
would now be fully deductible. 193 Furthermore, since basis is set at zero,
the need to depreciate is dispensed with, along with all the attendant
difficulties of computing accelerated depreciation and recapturing excess
depreciation. 1 94 Clearly, this proposed reform would further the cause of
tax simplification.
For all that it accomplishes, this reform should create no long-term
loss in revenues. Deferring tax on an appreciating asset merely causes
the government's unrealized revenues to increase at the same rate of re-
turn as the taxpayer's investment. Subsection (d) of the proposed statute
makes all property taxable upon the death of the taxpayer. Thus, the
eventual tax liability is inescapable.195 There is no guarantee that there
193. Under current law this is a crucial distinction. Expenses are immediately and totally
deductible while capital improvements add to the value of a given property and must be depre-
ciated along with the rest of that property, which in some cases may take over 30 years. Capi-
tal improvements are generally defined as those which increase the value of a property for
substantially more than one year. This definition becomes highly problematic in application,
and the distinction is inevitably debatable. See id. §§ 212, 263.
194. Depreciation is the annual deduction allowed for the loss of value in a property due to
aging and wear. Currently, the Code allows property to be depreciated over periods ranging
from three to fifty years depending on the specific type of property involved. Under certain
circumstances, the Code also allows the depreciation allowance to be "accelerated" - that Is,
a majority of the total depreciation which will eventually be allowed may be taken in the early
years of ownership. Id. § 168. However, if an asset has not been sufficiently depreciated at the
time of its sale, some of the gain from the sale may be "recaptured" as ordinary income rather
than capital gain. Id. §§ 1245, 1250.
195. Under current law, when property is received by inheritance, its basis is increased or
"stepped up" from the historical cost to the decedent, minus depreciation, to a figure equal to
the property's fair value at the time of the owner's death. Thus, if a taxpayer can retain a
property until his death, he can pass it on to his heirs without an accompanying tax liability,
and the property's gain is never taxed. Id. § 1012. The proposed reform would therefore
eliminate this "loophole." I
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might not be a temporary revenue loss in the short-term before accumu-
lated gains begin to be recognized. This shortfall, however, would
merely represent a delay in the collection of revenues. As such, it would
not be unreasonable for the government to borrow against these future
revenues by selling bonds.
There may be a concern that under this statute a taxpayer has total
control over when income is recognized. For example, a taxpayer might
try to take an investment deduction in the current year with the anticipa-
tion that he may be able to later recognize the gain in a year in which he
is in a lower tax bracket. If Congress found this possibility abusive, how-
ever, they could simply require that all investment proceeds be automati-
cally subject to the maximum rate.
VI. CONCLUSION
The experiences of Japan and the United States demonstrate that
the best way to stimulate capital formation is by allowing gains to be
freely reinvested. Rather than adopt a measure which merely cuts the
applicable rate on capital gains, Congress should enact legislation which
is based on this non-recognition principle. The legislation proposed by
this Note, which calls for the full deductibility of all investments and the
the full recognition of all proceeds from their sale, provides such a
model. In terms of simplicity, fairness, and efficiency, this proposed legis-
lation is vastly superior to both the current law and foreseeable congres-
sional changes.
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